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A Question of Title: Has the Common Law been 
Misapplied to Dispossess the Aboriginals? 
KENT MCNEIL' 
For t y e  it is that neither fraud nor might can make a title where there wanteth 
right. 
The colonization of Australia by the British has been legally justified by 
assumptions which, until recently, were thought by the colonizers to be self- 
evident. The received view has always been that the Aboriginals were devoid 
of any form of sovereignty at the time the British Crown decided to annex the 
territory inhabited by them to its  dominion^.^ It was therefore believed to be 
unnecessary for sovereignty to be acquired from the Aboriginals by conquest 
or cession. The Crown could ignore their presence and simply annex Australia 
by settlement, an original mode of acquisition appropriate for unoccupied 
territories. In Cooper v Stuart, the leading authority on the issue, Lord 
Watson put it like this: 
There is a great difference between the case of a Colony acquired by 
conquest or cession, in which there is an established system of law, and that 
of a Colony which consisted of a tract of territory practically unoccupied, 
without settled inhabitants or settled law, at the time when it was peacefully 
annexed to the British dominions. The Colony of New South Wales belongs 
to the latter class.3 
Yet Aboriginal people were there at the time, living in stable societies gov- 
erned by elaborate systems of rules and customs which were 'highly adapted 
to the country in which [they] led their lives. . . and. . . remarkably free from 
the vagaries of personal whim or infl~ence.'~ Though Western European con- 
cepts of sovereignty were no doubt unknown to them, they lived in factually 
self-governing communities which were independent of any foreign power. 
The assumption of the Crown and courts of English law that the Aboriginals 
were devoid of sovereignty is rooted in a European view of the world which 
probably would have been incomprehensible to the Aboriginals. It involves a 
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, North York, Ontario. I would like to 
thank Professors Harry Glasbeek, Peter Hogg, Brian Slattery and Timothy Youdan for 
their very helpful comments on drafts of this article. 
Unknown poet quoted anonymously in Altham's Case(1610) 8 Co R 150b, 153b; 77 ER 
701 707 . - - , . - . . 
Eg, see R v Murrell(1836) 1 Legge 72, 73. 
(1889) 14 App Cas 286, 291. See also Macdonald v Levy (1833) 1 Legge 39, 45; Milirr- 
pum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141, 242-244; New South Wales v Com- 
monwealth ofAustralia (1975) 135 CLR 337, 368; R v Wedge [I9761 1 NSWLR 581, 
582-84. For a recent discussion, see Lumb, 'Aboriginal Land Rights: Judicial 
Approaches in Perspective' (1988) 62 ALJ 273. 
Blackburn J, in Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141,267 (referring to the 
Rirratjingu, Gumatj and Djapu clans inhabiting the Gove Peninsula in the Northern 
Territory). In Coe v Commonwealth ofAustralia (1979) 53 ALJR 403, 412, Murphy J 
(dissenting) said: 'There is a wealth of historical material to support the claim that the 
aboriginal people . . . had a complex social and political organization [and] that their 
laws were settled and of great antiquity'. 
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denial of the existence of a valid Aboriginal perspective, and is thus charac- 
teristic of the self-serving ethnocentricity upon which colonialism is 
based. 
Given that the classification of Australia as settled rests on the assumption 
that the Aboriginals were not sovereign, one can understand efforts which 
have been made to reclassify Australia as conquered. However, in addition to 
validating the claim of Aboriginal communities that they were politically 
autonomous prior to colonization, reclassification has sometimes been seen 
as a means for advancing the cause of land claims.' The view that land claims 
have a better chance of succeeding in conquered territories is apparently 
based on the well-established rule of British colonial law that, in conquests, 
local laws continue until repealed or replaced by the Crown or Parliament, 
unlike settlements, where English law applies from the moment the Crown 
acquires ~overeignty.~ In a conquest, pre-existing land rights arising under 
local law are thus presumed to continue unless seized into the Crown's hands 
by act of state during the course of the conquest or subsequently extinguished 
by legislation.' However, in a settlement it does not follow from the fact that 
English law is received automatically that pre-existing land rights do not con- 
tinue. The reception rule contains an important qualification, namely that 
English law is received only to the extent that it is applicable to the circum- 
stances of the new colony.' One relevant circumstance would be the presence 
of pre-existing land rights held under a local system of law.9 Moreover, in 
England the common law has accommodated real property rights held by 
virtue of local c u ~ t o m , ' ~  and English law has been applied to the same effect in 
settled colonies such as the Gold Coast (now part of Ghana), Sierra Leone, 
5 Eg, see reference to argument of plaintiffs' counsel in Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd 
(1 97 1) 17 FLR 14 1,243-4. See also Coe v Commonwealth ofAustralia (1 979) 53 ALJR 
403; D C Hodgson, 'Aboriginal Australians and the World Court I - Sovereignty by 
Conquest' [I9851 NZLJ 33. 
See Blankard v Galdy (1693) Holt KB 341; 90 ER 1089; PC Memorandum (1722) 2 P 
Wms 75; 24 ER 646; Macdonald v Levy (1833) 1 Legge 39,45; Buchanan v The Com- 
monwealth (1913) 16 CLR 315, 333-4. 
See Re Southern Rhodesia [I91 91 AC 2 1 1,233; Amodu Tijani v The Secretary, Southern 
Nigeria [I9211 2 AC 399, esp 407; Bakare Ajakaiye v Lieutenant-Governor, Southern 
Provinces [I9291 AC 679; and discussion in K McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989), 16 1-79. 
SeeRvFarrell(1831) 1 Legge 5, esp9-11,16-20; WhickervHume(1858) 7 HCL 124, at 
150-53,160-61,166; 11 ER 50,60-62,65,67; Cooper v Stuart (1 889) 14 App Cas 286, 
29 1-292. 
In settled parts of Canada, the Supreme Court has recognized the pre-existing rights of 
the aboriginal peoples based on their occupation and use of their traditional lands: see 
Calder v A-G ofBritish Columbia [I9731 SCR 31 3, esp 328,375-6; Guerin v The Queen 
[I9841 2 SCR 335, 376-9; Roberts v Canada [I9891 1 SCR 322, 340. However, the 
relationship between these rights and customary law has not been clarified by Canadian 
courts: see McNeil, supra fn7, 274-89. 
lo  Eg, although the common law did not permit freehold interests in land to be left by will, 
this was permissible by local custom, particularly in boroughs: see Simpson, A History of 
theLandlaw (2nd ed, 1986) 138-9. The descent of lands was also subject to the customs 
of borough English and gavelkind: ibid, 20-21. Moreover, local custom occasionally 
allows for special rights over land: see Mercer v Denne [I9041 2 Ch 534, affirmed [I9051 
2 Ch 538, where fishermen inhabiting a parish were held to have a customary right to dry 
their nets on privately-owned lands near the sea. 
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Pitcairn Island, British New Guinea (now part of Papua New Guinea) and 
Ocean Island." 
So reclassifying Australia as conquered probably would not enhance the 
cause of land rights claimed on the basis of customary Aboriginal law. If such 
rights existed they should have continued regardless of whether Australia was 
conquered or settled.12 On this point Mr Justice Blackburn's conclusion in 
Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd13 that customary rights to land in a settlement 
are unenforceable against the Crown unless recognized by legislative or execu- 
tive act is unsupported by the weight of authority in other jurisdictions and 
should not be followed.14 
But not only would reclassification of Australia not confer any particular 
advantage on Aboriginal land claimants - it might actually harm them. The 
reason for this is that even if Aboriginal claimants cannot establish a cus- 
tomary law title,I5 the common law itself should provide them with a title to 
lands occupied by their ancestors when the Crown acquired sovereignty, a 
title which probably would not be available if Australia was conquered 
because the common law would not have been received at that time. This 
suggestion involves a total rejection of the standard assumption that, at the 
moment Australia was settled, English law gave the Crown fee simple title to 
all lands in the territory. This assumption was judicially reaffirmed by Black- 
burn J in the Milirrpum case, where he commented on earlier Australian 
decisions dealing with the issue of the Crown's original title to land: 
They all affirm the principle, fundamental to the English law of real prop- 
erty, that the Crown is the source of title to all land; that no subject can own 
land allodially, but only an estate or interest in it which he holds mediately 
or immediately of the Crown. On the foundation of New South Wales, 
therefore, and of South Australia, every square inch of territory in the 
colony became the property of the Crown. All titles, rights, and interests 
See K McNeil, supra fn 7, pp 179-9 1. 
l 2  Accord Hookey, 'Settlement and Sovereignty', in P Hanks and B Keon-Cohen, (eds) 
Aborigines and the Law (Sydney, George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 1-1 8. 
l 3  (1971) 17 FLR 141, 198-262, esp 223, 244. 
l4 Scholarly opinion is almost unanimous in its denunciation of Blackburn on this issue: 
see generally J Hookey, 'The Gove Land Rights Case: A Judicial Dispensation for the 
Taking of Aboriginal Lands in Australia? (1 972) 5 FL Rev 85; Lester and Parker, 'Land 
Rights: The Australian Aborigines Have Lost a Legal Battle, But . . .' (1973) 11 Alta L 
Rev 189; B Hocking, 'Does Aboriginal Law Now Run in Australia? (1979) 10 FL Rev 
16 1; Slattery, 'The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples' (D Phil thesis, Oxford, 
1979), ch 2; Lester, 'The Territorial Rights of the Inuit of the Canadian Northwest 
Territories: A Legal Argument' (D Jur thesis, York University, Ontario, 1981), esp pt 4; 
Bartlett, 'Aboriginal Land Claims at Common Law' (1983) 15 UWAL Rev 293; McHugh, 
'The Aboriginal Rights of the New Zealand Maori at Common Law' (Ph D thesis, 
Cambridge, 1987), esp ch 6.  Compare L J Priestley, 'Communal Native Title and the 
Common Law: Further Thoughts on the Gove Land Rights Case' (1974) 6 FL Rev 
150. 
l5  At common law, custom is a matter of fact which cannot be taken account of judicially 
until proved: see R v Monkey(l861) 1 W & W (CL) 40,41; Angu v Attah (1916) PC Gold 
Coast 1874-1928 43, 44; Re Bed of Wanganui River [I9551 NZLR 419, 432. In the 
Milirrpum case the plaintiffs did establish the existence of a customary system of law, 
but they failed to convince Blackburn J that their customary relationship to the land was 
proprietary in nature: (1971) 17 FLR 141, 267-74. 
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whatever in land which existed thereafter in subjects of the Crown were the 
direct consequence of some grant from the Crown.I6 
Blackburn J thus seems to have thought that the system of tenures, which was 
received in Australia along with the rest of the applicable common law at the 
time of settlement, gave the Crown title to all land, regardless of the Abor- 
iginal presence. In other words, the common law itself dispossessed the 
Aboriginals. Considering that the Aboriginal people had been living in Aus- 
tralia and using land in their own ways for thousands of years, this is a 
startling conclusion. It offends common sense and is manifestly unjust. But it 
is also wrong as a matter of law because, as this article will demonstrate, it 
involves a misunderstanding of the effect of the application of the tenurial 
system. Blackburn J nonetheless thought that strong and even binding auth- 
orities compelled him to reach this conclusion. It is therefore necessary to 
start with a re-examination of these authorities. 
THE PRE-MILIRRPUM AUSTRALIAN AUTHORITIES 
The earliest decision referred to by Blackburn J on the issue of the Crown's 
original title to land in Australia was   he King v Steel,I7 involving an infor- 
mation of intrusion laid in 1834 to recover land in Sydney which the Crown 
had leased to the defendant's predecessors in title for a term which had ex- 
pired twenty-seven years before. The jurors returned a verdict for the Crown. 
No doubt one reason for this was that they had been told by Chief Justice 
Forbes that the defendant, having derived his title and received possession by 
lease from the Crown, was estopped in law from denying the Crown's title.'' 
But in his address to them, Forbes had also made some sweeping remarks on 
the Crown's title to land in New South Wales generally: 
By the laws of England, the King, in virtue of his crown, is the possessor of 
all the unappropriated lands of the Kingdom; and all his subjects are pre- 
sumed to hold their lands, by original grant from the Crown. The same law 
applies to this Colony. It is a matter of history that New South Wales was 
taken possession of, in the name of the King of Great Britain, about fifty- 
five years ago.. .. The right of the soil, and of all lands in the Colony, 
became vested immediately upon its settlement, in His Majesty, in right of 
his crown, and as the representative of the British Nation.I9 
Forbes CJ thus seems to have regarded possession as the source of the Crown's 
title to the territory of New South Wales. However, acquisition of title to 
territory (ie, sovereignty) does not necessarily involve acquisition of title to 
land.20 With respect to lands within the colony, Chief Justice Forbes's con- 
clusion that the Crown acquired both possession of, and title to, them 
l6  (1971) 17 FLR 141, 245. 
l 7  (1834) 1 Legge 65. 
18 Id. 69. 
l 9  1d: 68-9. 
See A-G v Nissan [I9701 AC 179,210-1 1; Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial 
Law (1966), 99, 625-36. 
Has the Common Law been Misapplied to Dispossess the Aboriginals? 95 
appears to have been based on the assumption that they were unappropriated 
when the colony was settled. In one sense, the word 'unappropriated' means 
unpos~essed.~' This raises the question: If Aboriginals had been in actual 
possession (ie, occupation) of lands in the territory at the time of settlement, 
would those lands have been unappropriated? If appropriated by Aboriginals, 
could the Crown have acquired title to them by virtue of its acquisition of title 
to the territory? Would the English law rule that subjects are presumed to hold 
their lands by original grant from the Crown have applied in those circum- 
stances, and if so, to what effect? These questions were not addressed by 
Forbes CJ, no doubt because he was not confronted with the issue of Abor- 
iginal occupation. But these sorts of questions should have been considered in 
the Milirrpum case, and need to be kept in mind when examining the Aus- 
tralian authorities upon which Blackburn J relied in that case. 
In Hatjield v decided by the New South Wales Supreme Court in 
1846, the plaintiff was in possession of certain land by virtue of a lease from 
the defendant when a third party claimed the land under a Crown grant. One 
issue was the validity of the grant, which depended on whether the Crown had 
title at the time it was issued. The court held that the Crown did have title, 
apparently without proof to that effect. According to Chief Justice Stephen, 
no evidence was required that the Crown was the legal owner of all land in the 
colony at the time of settlement in 1788, because judicial notice is taken of the 
fact. The Crown, he continued, must therefore be presumed to have had title 
when the grant was made, in the absence of evidence, or suggestion, of a 
previous grant.23 Dickinson J said that 'the King, at the time of the grant . . ., 
never had been out of possession of that land, which, in common with the 
whole territory, had vested originally in the Crown by discovery and occu- 
pancy of part in the name of the whole'.24 Once again, the Supreme Court 
made no mention of the presence of the Aboriginals, apparently assuming that 
New South Wales had been vacant in so far as possession of land was con- 
cerned. That assumption permitted Dickinson J to conclude that the Crown's 
occupancy of a part of the colony extended to all lands within the colony's 
boundaries. However, the rule that occupation of part of a tract of land 
extends to the whole does not apply to parts actually occupied by somebody 
else.25 Thus, if any lands within New South Wales were occupied by Abor- 
21 Underground water is unappropriated prior to being taken possession of, eg, by sinking a 
well and bringing it to the surface: Ballard v Tomlinson (1 885) 29 Ch D 1 15. Re appro- 
priation of surface water by occupation and use, see Mason v Hill(1833) 5 B & Ad I; 1 10 
ER 692; Cookv City of Vancouver(1912) 17 BCR 477, affirmed [I9141 AC 1077. In Re 
Levy(1924) 26 OWN 300,301-302, Riddell J said that property, including land, can be 
appropriated by exercising dominion over it 'to the extent and for the purpose of making 
it subserve one's own proper use and pleasure'. 
22 (1846) 1 Legge 330. 
23 Id, 336. See also 337, where Stephen CJ said that all land titles in New South Wales are 
derived from the Crown. However, he apparently did not have the Aboriginals in mind, 
for at 338 he said that the 'colonists . . . hold lands under the Crown only, granted at 
intervals. . .'. 
24 Id, 345. 
25 Earle v Walker (1971) 22 DLR (3d) 284. 287. This is evident from the many cases 
involving dispossession of part of a manor or other unit of land: eg, see Asher v whitlock 
(1865)LR 1 QB 1. 
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iginals when the colony was established, one must ask whether those lands 
would have been available for occupancy by the Crown.26 
This brings us to Attorney-Generalv Brown," probably the most important 
case respecting the Crown's original title to land in Australia. There the exist- 
ence of this title was directly challenged by counsel and firmly upheld by a 
unanimous decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court. The action was 
commenced in 1846 by an information of intrusion, whereby the Attorney- 
General alleged that the defendant had intruded on coal veins and mines 
lawfully in the Crown's possession. The coal in question was located under 
land which the Crown had granted in 1840 to one Dumaresq, who then leased 
the land to the defendant. The Crown grant contained a reservation of, inter 
alia, 'all mines . . . of coals'.28 Defence counsel argued, in part, that the Crown 
had neither title to nor possession of the mines, for the Crown can take land 
only by matter of record, which in these circumstances necessitated 'an 
'office' found, or some equivalent pr~ceeding' .~~ He 'maintained that there 
was a material difference between dominion, or the right of sovereignty over 
the soil and country, which were unquestionably in the Crown, and the pos- 
session or the title to the possession in or of that soil, with power to grant the 
same at her discretion, which title he broadly denied'.30 In other words, de- 
fence counsel 'boldly asserted, and endeavoured to. . . [show], that the Crown 
has not and never had any property in the waste lands of the C~lony ' .~ '  
The judgment of the court in favour of the Crown was delivered by Chief 
Justice Stephen. On the issue of the Crown's title, he stated the court's opinion 
to be 
. . . that the waste lands of this Colony are, and ever have been, from the 
time of its first settlement in 1788, in the Crown; that they are, and ever 
have been, from that date (in point of legal intendment), without office 
found, in the Sovereign's possession; and that, as his or her property, they 
have been and may now be effectually granted to subjects of the 
Crown.32 
In support of these conclusions, Stephen CJ gave two related, but apparently 
separate, reasons. 
First, he said that 
[tlhe territory of New South Wales, and eventually the whole of the vast 
island of which it forms a part, have been taken possession of by British 
26 At common law, of course, once the Crown is in possession of lands, it (unlike other 
landholders) cannot be dispossessed: Lee v Norris (1594) Cro Eliz 331; 78 ER 581; 
TuthiN v Rogers (1844) 1 J & La T 36, 67, 77; Commonwealth ofAustralia v Anderson 
( 1  960) 105 CLR 303,3 12,3 14,3 18-24. But the issue here is whether the Crown acquired 
possession of all lands in Australia in the first place, given the Aboriginal presence. 
27 (1847) 1 Legge 312. For another discussion of this case, see Lester, supra fn14, 276- 
8 1 
28 (1847) 1 Legge 312, 3 13. 
29 Id, 316. 
30 Id, 314. 
31 1d; 316. 
32 Ibid. 
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subjects in the name of the Sovereign. They belong, therefore, to the British 
Crown.33 
The Crown's title, not only to the territory, but to all waste lands within it, was 
therefore acquired by occupancy. Moreover, unlike in England, where the 
Crown's original title to lands as 'universal occupant' is generally a fiction, 
adopted for the purposes of the feudal system, 
. . . in a newly-discovered country, settled by British subjects, the occu- 
pancy of the Crown with respect to the waste lands of that country, is no 
fiction. If, in one sense, those lands be the patrimony of the nation, the 
Sovereign is the representative, and the executive authority of the nation, 
the 'moral personality' (as Vattel calls him, Law ofNations, book 1 ,  chap 4), 
by whom the nation acts, and in whom for such purposes its power resides. 
Here is a property, depending for its support on no feudal notions or prin- 
~ i p l e . ~ ~  
Secondly, Stephen CJ thought that the same result could be arrived at 'by 
the adaption of the feudal fiction',35 which, as a part of the system of tenures, 
was brought by the settlers to New South Wales, along with so much of the rest 
of the common law as was consistent with local conditions. In other words, 
when applied in the colonies, the fiction of original Crown ownership oper- 
ated to vest the property in waste lands in the S ~ v e r e i g n . ~ ~  
Having concluded that the Crown was originally entitled to the waste lands, 
Stephen CJ summarily dismissed the argument that an office or other record 
of the Crown's title was necessary. He pointed out that, in all instances where 
it had been said that the Crown can take lands only by record, the taking had 
been from a subject. Moreover, in some cases where the Crown's title was 
notorious, as where the Crown had seized lands of an alien ratione guerre, no 
record was required. 'The idea', he said, 'that he [the King] cannot acquire 
lands in a newly settled country, by discovery, and the settlement of his sub- 
jects therein (facts which must be always notorious, and speedily a matter of 
history), but must resort to the form of an 'office' to give him title, appears to 
us scarcely to admit of serious ref~tation'.~' On this point Stephen CJ was 
undoubtedly correct, for no record of the Crown's title is required where that 
title is ~riginal,~' as the Crown's title to waste lands in New South Wales would 
have been. But the question of how the Crown acquired this original title 
needs to be looked at more closely. 
In English law, an original title to property which is unowned and unoccu- 
pied can be acquired by taking possession of it, ie, by occupancy.39 In the case 
of settlements, the Crown's territorial title was acquired in this way, by British 
33 Id, 317. 
34 Id. 31 8. 
35 1d; 324. 
36 Id, 31 8. 
37 Id, 320. 
38 Examples within the realm are the foreshore and territorial seabed: see K McNeil, supra 
fn 7, 105. 
39 See Holden v Smallbrooke (I 668) Vaugh 187; 124 ER 1030; Blackstone, Commentaries 
on the Laws ofEngland (16th ed, 1825), vol 11, 3-9, 258, 400-401. 
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subjects taking possession of the territories on behalf of the Crown.40 Accord- 
ing to British colonial law, inhabited as well as uninhabited territories could 
be acquired in this fashion, provided the Crown acted as though the inhabi- 
tants lacked sovereign status.41 The territorial unit was available for acquisi- 
tion by occupancy because the Crown treated it as unowned and unoccupied 
by a ~overeign.~' Moreover, any lands within the settlement which were 
unowned and unoccupied would have been acquired at the same time, since 
the Crown's occupancy of the territory as a whole would have extended to 
them.43 AS Stephen CJ concluded, the Crown would therefore have had title to 
waste lands in New South Wales by way of occupancy. 
In light of this conclusion that the Crown had an actual title by occupancy, 
there was no need to resort to the feudal fiction. The fiction that the Crown 
once owned all the lands in England, some ofwhich it then granted to subjects, 
was a device invented by common law jurists to justify the feudal concept of 
the Crown's paramount lordship over lands held by subjects.44 The fiction was 
deemed necessary because many lands in fact had never been owned by the 
Crown, and had not been acquired by subjects by grant. Moreover, like any 
fiction, it would apply only to give effect to the purpose for which it was 
invented.45 To apply it to lands which the Crown was actually entitled to by 
occupancy, and which were unclaimed by subjects, would make no sense. In 
that situation, not only would the Crown's title have a factual basis, but the 
system of tenures itself would be inapplicable, since no tenurial relationship, 
between the Crown as lord and subjects as tenants, would exist. 
Chief Justice Stephen's use of the feudal fiction as an additional reason for 
holding the Crown to have title to waste lands was therefore both unnecessary 
and inappropriate. Perhaps he perceived this himself, for in Doe d Wilson v 
Terry, decided two years later, he said: 
In England, as we observed in the case of the Attorney-General v Brown, the 
title of the Sovereign to land is a fiction; or, where the Crown really owns 
land, the property is enjoyed as that of a subject is, and by a title which 
admits of proof by documentary and other evidence. Here, the title of the 
40 See Geary v Barecroft (1 667) 1 Sid 346; 82 ER 1 148; R v Kough (1 8 19) 1 Nfld LR 172, 
174; The 'Fama'(1804) 5 C Rob 106, 114-16; 165 ER 714, 717. 
41 The Crown's discretionary power to proceed as it wishes in annexing colonies is derived 
from its broad prerogative over foreign affairs: see K McNeil, supra fn 7, 1 1 1, 13 1. 
42 Acquisition of sovereignty, by whatever means the Crown chooses, is an act of state, the 
validity of which cannot be questioned in the courts: Cook v Sprigg [I8991 AC 572,578; 
Vajesingji Joravarsingji v Secretary of State for India ( 1  924) LR 5 1 IA 357, 360; Coe v 
Commonwealth ofAustralia (1979) 53 ALJR 403, per Gibbs J 408. See also R v Kent 
Justices [I9671 1 All ER 560, 564; Post Ofice v Estuary Radio Ltd [I9681 2 QB 740, 
753. 
43 See Falkland Islands Co v The Queen (1864) 2 Moo PC (NS) 266, 15 ER 902, for the 
application of this principle to an uninhabited territory. 
44 See Anon, Considerations on the Law of Forfeitures, for High Treason (4th ed, 1775), 
64-65; Blackstone, supra fn 39, vol 11, 51; cfA-G of Ontario v Mercer (1883) 8 App Cas 
767,771-2. 
45 On this limitation on the use of fictions, see Morris v Pugh (1761) 3 Burr 1241; 97 ER 
81 1; Mostyn v Fabrigas (1775) 1 Cowp 161, 177; 98 ER 1021, 1030; Lyttleton v Cross 
(1824) 3 B & C 317, 325-6; 107 ER 751, 754-5. 
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Crown as universal occupant is a reality, and there is no proof of it required, 
or admi~s ib le .~~  
This statement followed a distinction Stephen CJ drew between 'newly dis- 
covered and unpeopled territories' (a description which apparently applied to 
New South Wales), and 'a populated and long-settled country' (England).47 In 
the former, he said, lands are 'unoccupied and waste, until granted by the 
Crown to some individual, willing to reclaim them from a state of nature', 
whereas in the latter most lands 'have for centuries been owned and cultivated 
by its [the Crown's] subjects'.48 
Stephen CJ thus seems to have regarded all lands in New South Wales as 
unoccupied and waste, perhaps because they had been uncultivated and, pre- 
sumably, unowned. Hence, they were available for acquisition by occupancy 
by the Crown. In the judgments we have considered, Stephen CJ mentioned 
aboriginals only once, in a context which does not appear to have been 
intended to include the indigenous inhabitants of Australia. The reference is 
in Attorney-General v Brown, in a passage in which Stephen CJ rejected a 
contention that land titles in the colony were allodial.49 This contention, he 
said, was answered by the conclusion he had already reached that the Crown 
had title to lands. With respect to 'allodium', Stephen CJ observed that 
'[wlhether the term implies a property acquired by lot, or a conquest, or one 
left in the occupation of the ancient owners, (that is, of the aboriginal inhabi- 
tants, see Steph. Com. title Tenures, and the authorities there cited,) it equally 
rejects the supposition of a title, in or from the S~vereign'. '~ As an examin- 
ation of Stephen's Commentaries reveals, the aboriginal inhabitants referred 
to were those left in occupation of their lands by the 'barbarians' at the time 
they invaded the Roman E m ~ i r e . ~ '  Apparently Chief Justice Stephen did not 
direct his mind to the question of the relationship of Australian Aboriginals to 
land. 
The opinion of the New South Wales Supreme Court that the Crown had 
original title to all lands in the colony has been affirmed by the High Court of 
Australia. 
Williams v Attorney-General for New South Wales,'' decided in 19 13, in- 
volved a dispute over whether the Government of New South Wales could 
discontinue the use of Government House in Sydney as the residence for the 
Sovereign's representative. One issue to be decided was whether the lands on 
which that building stood were 'waste lands of [or 'belonging to'] the Crown', 
over which management, control and legislative powers had been conferred 
on the legislature of the colony by the Constitution Act 1 855.53 The High Court 
Justices who dealt with this issue decided in favour of the New South Wales 
46 (1849) 1 Legge 505, 508-9 (footnote omitted). 
47 Id, 508. 
48 Ibid. 
49 (1847) 1 Legge 312, 323-4. 
5O Id, 324. 
5 1  J H Stephen, New Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland (1st ed, London, Butterworth, 
1841), vol I, 160-2. 
52 (1913) 16 CLR 404. 
53 18 & 19 Vic c 54 (UK) s2, sch I para 43. 
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Government. Chief Justice Barton, after describing New South Wales as 'a 
territory which the Crown has acquired by posse~sion',~~ said this: 
Waste lands of the Crown, where not otherwise defined, are simply, I think, 
such of the lands of which the Crown became the absolute owner on taking 
possession of this country as the Crown had not made the subject of any 
proprietary right on the part of any citizen.55 
This would seem to confirm the conclusion reached above that the Crown's 
title to the colony, and to at least some lands within it, had been acquired by 
occupancy. But the Chief Justice did not specify the extent of such lands, nor 
did he mention possible claims by Aboriginals. 
Isaacs J, however, after coming to a conclusion similar to that of the Chief 
Justice on the meaning of waste lands of the Crown, had more to say on the 
Crown's title to colonial land generally: 
It has always been a fixed principle of English law that the Crown is the 
proprietor of all land for which no subject can show a title. When Colonies 
were acquired this feudal principle extended to the lands oversea. The mere 
fact that men discovered and settled upon the new territory gave them no 
title to the soil. It belonged to the Crown until the Crown chose to grant it. 
Professor Jenks, in his History of the Australasian Colonies, at p. 59, ob- 
serves that this purely technical and antiquarian fiction settled a question 
of the first magnitude. 
There was, as he says, 'no Statute, no struggle, no heated debate. The 
Crown quietly assumed the ownership of Australian land.' I should add, 
this doctrine received very practical application when the Crown, by Gov- 
ernor Bourke's proclamation, approved by the Colonial Office, refused to 
recognize Batman's treaty with the native chiefs in 1835, and notified that 
persons found in possession of the lands would be treated as trespassers and 
intruders. So we start with the unquestionable position that, when Gover- 
nor Phillip received his first Commission from King George 111 on 12th 
October 1786, the whole of the lands of Australia were already in law the 
property of the King of England.56 
Isaacs J thus relied on the feudal fiction rather than on occupancy as the basis 
of the Crown's title to lands. But we have seen that the fiction would be 
inapplicable where lands that were unowned and unoccupied were concerned, 
because, as Barton CJ said, the Crown would have become absolute owner of 
them upon taking possession of the colony, and so no tenurial relations would 
have existed respecting them. The fiction is applicable only where lands are 
54 (1913) 16 CLR 404,427. 
55 Id, 428. 
56 Id, 439. Mr Justice Isaacs's views were to some extent approved in New South Wales v 
Commonwealth of Australia (1975) 135 CLR 337, a post-Milirrpum case involving a 
dispute between the Commonwealth and the Australian States over the territorial sea 
and continental shelf, by Stephen J 438-9 (footnotes omitted): 'That originally the waste 
lands in the colonies were owned by the British Crown is not in doubt. Such ownership 
may perhaps be regarded as springing from a prerogative right, proprietary in nature. . .. 
On the other hand that ownership may be described as a consequence of the feudal 
principle which, on first settlement in Australia, was 'extended to the lands oversea', so 
that all colonial land belonged 'to the Crown until the Crown chose to grant it' (per Isaacs 
J in Williams' Case). In either event the consequence is the same, the lands pf Australia 
became the property of the King of England (Attorney-General v. Brown). 
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already held by subjects, and prior Crown ownership and grants need to be 
postulated to explain why those lands are held of the Crown. 
Mr Justice Isaacs's treatment of this matter is open to other criticisms as 
well. For one thing, one may wonder (as Blackburn J did in the Milirrpum 
case5') how the Crown acquired title to land before Governor Phillip even 
took possession of the territory in 1788. More importantly, Isaacs J was 
simply wrong when he said '[ilt has always been a fixed principle of English 
law that the Crown is the proprietor of all land for which no subject can show a 
title'.58 The existence of such a principle was expressly denied by the House of 
Lords in Bristow v Cormican, where Lord Blackburn said it is so far from 
being the case that the Crown is entitled by the prerogative to such land 
that, 
. . . in the only instance in which no one could shew a title, I mean that of an 
estate granted to one for the life of another, where the grantee died leaving 
the cestui que vie, the law cast the freehold on the first occupant of the land. 
It was never thought that the Crown was entitled in such a case.59 
To Lord Blackburn's example of occupancy of a vacant pur autre vie estate 
might be added that of a title acquired by adverse possession. In the event that 
a landholder's title is extinguished by statutory limitation in England, the 
adverse possessor acquires a valid title, not by statutory conveyance, but 
simply by being in possession of land to which no one else can show a better 
right.60For the Crown to succeed in claiming such land for itself, it would have 
to prove that it has a title, for, as Lord Davey said in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, 
'[iln a constitutional country the assertion of title by the Attorney-General in 
a Court of Justice can be treated as pleading only, and requires to be sup- 
ported by e~idence'.~' 
Unlike Barton CJ, Isaacs J did refer to the Aboriginals and may have 
implicitly denied them any title to lands when he said that Governor Bourke's 
proclamation refusing to recognize Batman's 1835 treaty with them was an 
example of the practical application of the doctrine which gave ownership of 
all Australian lands to the Crown. However, Batman was a private individual 
who had no authority from the Crown to purchase lands from the Aborigi- 
n a l ~ . ~ ~  His 'treaty' may have been invalid because any title the Aboriginals had 
was regarded as inalienable other than to the Crown, and not because the 
Aboriginals had nothing to sell.63 Moreover, even if Isaacs J did intend to deny 
57 (1971) 17 FLR 141;246. 
58 (1913) 16 CLR 404, 439 (supra, text at fn 56). 
59 (1 878) 3 App Cas 641,667 (footnote omitted); and see per Lord Cairns at 652-3, Lord 
Hatherley at 658. 
60 Tichbornev Weir(1892) 67 LT 735; In reAtkinson andHorsell's Contract [I9121 2 Ch 1, 
9, 17; Fairweather v St Marylebone Pty [I9631 AC 510, esp 535. 
61 [I9011 AC 56 1,576. Accord Wallis v Solicitor-General for New Zealand [I9031 AC 173, 
188. 
62 On the Batman dealings, see Bonwick, Port Phillip Settlement (1883), chs 14-15; B 
Hocking, 'Native Land Rights' (LLM thesis, Monash University, 1970), 167-174. 
63 Case law from some common lawjurisdictions contains a rule that the title of aboriginal 
people to their traditional lands cannot be purchased by anyone except the Crown: 
Johnson v M'lntosh, 8 Wheat 543 (1823); The Queen v Symonds (1847) [1840-19321 
NZPCC 387; Guerin v The Queen [I9841 2 SCR 335, esp 382; and discussion in McNeil, 
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that the Aboriginals had land rights, his remark to that effect was obiter, 
unsupported by authority or analysis, and unconcurred in by other members 
of the court. 
A second High Court decision mentioned by Blackburn J in the Milirrpum 
case, in support of his conclusion that the Crown acquired title to all lands in 
Australia the moment it acquired sovereignty, is Council of the Municipality 
ofRandwick v R ~ t l e d g e . ~ ~  The question to be decided was whether Randwick 
Racecourse was 'a public reserve', and therefore exempt from rating under the 
New South Wales Local Government Act 19 1 9.65 In construing these words to 
exclude the racecourse, Windeyer J, whose judgment was concurred in by the 
majority of the court, referred to the history of Crown lands legislation in New 
South Wales. He introduced this historical analysis with the following obser- 
vations: 
On the first settlement of New South Wales (then comprising the whole of 
eastern Australia), all the land in the colony became in law vested in the 
Crown. The early Governors had express powers under their commissions 
to make grants of land. The principles of English real property law, with 
socage tenure as the basis, were introduced into the colony from the begin- 
ning - all lands of the territory lying in the grant of the Crown, and until 
granted forming a royal demesne. . .. And when in 1847 a bold argument, 
which then had a political flavour, challenged the right of the Crown, that 
was to say of the Home Government, to dispose of land in the colony, it was 
as a legal proposition firmly and final1 disposed of by Sir A p e d  Stephen 
C.J.: The Attorney-General v. Brown. 6t? 
Although Windeyer J did not specify how the Crown acquired its title to all 
the lands in the colony, he apparently approved of Stephen CJ's treatment of 
the matter in Brown's case, where, we have seen, the Chief Justice relied pri- 
marily on occupancy. Like Stephen J, however, he does not seem to have 
considered whether the Aboriginals had valid claims. 
To sum up, there is a long line of authority that the Crown acquired absol- 
ute title to all lands in the Australian colonies at the time they were settled. 
Underlying this conclusion is a common assumption that the lands were 
vacant, ie, unowned and unoccupied. As such, they were available for Crown 
acquisition by occupancy. Since the judges who decided the pre-Milirrpum 
cases we have examined must have been aware of the presence of Aboriginals, 
one can only conclude that they regarded those people as non-owners and 
non-occupiers. However, the question of whether Aboriginals were owners or 
occupiers at the time sovereignty was acquired is clearly a factual matter, 
requiring proof.67 Since no evidence to that effect appears to have been before 
supra fn 7, 221-35. Cf Blackburn J's comments on the Batman treaty in Milirrpum v 
Nabalco Ptv Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141. 257. 
64 (1959) 102 CLR 54. 
65 S 132(l)(c). 
(1959) 102 CLR 54, 71 (footnote omitted). 
67 Aboriginal ownership would depend on customary law, which must be proved: supra 
fn15. Occupation of land is equally a matter of fact (Halsbury's Laws ofEngland [4th ed, 
19851, vol XLV, para 1394), which can be proved by showing acts of use or control on or 
in relation to the land: eg, see Jones v Williams (1837) 2 M & W 326; 1 50 ER 781; West 
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the courts in any of these cases, it is perhaps not surprising that the judges 
disregarded the Aboriginal presence, particularly in view of the scarcity of 
archaeological and anthropological material on Aboriginal culture available 
when most of these cases were decided.68 Moreover, because Aboriginal 
ownership and occupation are matters of fact, negative findings - and a 
fortiori unexpressed assumptions - regarding those matters would not be 
binding in subsequent court cases.(j9 
In the Milirrpum case, Blackburn J therefore should not have regarded the 
cases discussed above as binding upon him in this respect. Unlike the judges 
in those cases, he was presented with extensive evidence of the relationship of 
specific groups of Aboriginals to defined areas of land. The question of 
whether those groups owned the claimed lands by virtue of customary law 
titles predating the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty was directly before 
him. As we have seen, he did decide that question, denying the plaintiffs' 
customary law claims, which simply reinforced the conclusion he had already 
reached that the Crown had title regardless. But, at the same time, he ap- 
parently accepted that Aboriginals had been present on the claimed lands in 
1788, and there was no doubt that the plaintiffs were there when the action 
was brought. So the question we are now going to address is this: Assuming 
that Aboriginals were in occupation of specific lands at the time the Crown 
acquired sovereignty, what juridical effect, if any, would that have had? More 
specifically, would the Crown have acquired absolute title to those lands as it 
did to vacant lands, and if not, what respective interests would the Crown and 
the Aboriginal occupiers have had? Finally, we shall consider the relevance of 
our conclusions on these matters to non-statutory Aboriginal land claims 
today. 
THE LEGAL EFFECT OF ABORIGINAL OCCUPATION 
For the purposes of this discussion, we are going to assume that Aboriginals 
were in occupation of some lands at the time Australia was settled." As stated 
above, this is a factual matter, depending on historical, anthropological and 
other kinds of evidence which cannot be presented here. It may be remarked, 
however, that occupation is relative, depending on all the circumstances, 
including the nature and location of the land, and the conditions of life, habits 
Bank Estates Ltd v Arthur [I9671 1 AC 665; Powell v McFarlane (1977) 38 P & CR 
452. 
There was, however, ample information on Aboriginal land use available in the form of 
observations by European settlers and explorers: see H Reynolds, The Law of theLand 
(Ringwood, Vic, Penguin, 1987), esp ch 1-3. 
69 '[Dlecisions on questions of fact do not constitute a precedent': Cross, Precedent in 
English Law (3rd ed, 1977), 221. Accord Halsbury's Laws ofEngland(4th ed, 1979), vol 
XXVI, para 575. 
70 The issue of occupation of land by aboriginal peoples generally is discussed in McNeil, 
supra fn 7, 196-204. Support for the conclusion that Aboriginals were in occupation of 
lands in Australia in 1788 can be found in H Reynolds, supra fn 68, esp chs. 1, 3. 
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and ideas of the people living there.71 On this basis, nomadic hunters and 
gatherers have been found to be in occupation of lands in the United States 
and Canada.72 Moreover, even in England, fishing in bodies of water and 
hunting on land are evidence of oc~upa t ion .~~  Thus, it is clearly not necessary 
for lands to be cultivated, fenced, built on or the like to be occupied.74 
In English law, persons who are in occupation of land are presumed to have 
title.75 This presumption is rebuttable by adverse claimants who can show 
better titles in themselves, but cannot be rebutted by proving that the occu- 
piers have no title apart from their oc~upation.'~ The rule is that those who 
claim lands occupied by others can recover only on the strength of their own 
title, not on the weakness of that of the occupiers.77 For much the same reason, 
occupiers of land are protected by law against trespassers, regardless of 
whether the occupiers have a valid title." As against those who cannot show a 
better right, occupation of itself is a sufficient title.'" 
Regarding the interest to which occupiers are entitled, it is presumed to be a 
fee simple estate, for occupation is prima facie evidence of seisin in fee." This 
presumption can be rebutted by showing that they have lesser interests," or 
no interests at all. To show the latter, it would not suffice to prove they did not 
acquire the fee by conveyance or other lawful means, for those whose occu- 
pation is wrongful have the fee in most casesz2 Rather, it would have to be 
established that the fee (or, in certain exceptional circumstances, a lesser 
interest) is in someone else.83 
71 LordAdvocate v Lord Lovat (1880) 5 App Cas 273, 288; Kirby v Cowderoy [I9121 AC 
599,603; Cadija Umma v S Don Manis Appu [I9391 AC 136, 141-2. 
72 See Mitchel v US, 9 Pet 71 1 (1835), 746; US v Santa Fe PaciJic Railroad, 314 US 339 
(1941), 345; Baker Lake v Minister of Indian Afairs [I9801 1 FC 518, esp 561. 
73 Curzon v Lomax (1803) 5 Esp 60; 170 ER 737; Harper v Charlesworth (1825) 4 B & C 
574,583-4; 107 ER 1 174,1177-8; RedHouseFarms (Thorndon) Ltdv Catchpole(l977) 
244 EG 295. 
74 Wuta-Ofei v Danquah [I9611 3 All ER 596, 600. 
l5 See DoedDraperv Lawley(l834) 3 N & M 331; DoedSmithandPaynev Webber(l834) 
1 AD & E 1 19; 1 10 ER 1 152; Whale v Hitchcock ( 1  876) 34 LT 136; Wheeler v Baldwin 
(1934) 52 CLR 609, esp 621-2; Allen v Roughley (1955) 94 CLR 98, 136-41. 
76 Were this not so, adverse possessors would be unable to  acquire irrebuttable titles, for as 
we have seen their titles are derived from their actual possession rather than from statu- 
tory conveyance: supra, text at fn 60. 
77 Roe d Haldane and Urry v Harvey (1769) 4 Burr 2484, 2487-8; 98 ER 302, 304-5; 
Goodtitle d Parker v Baldwin ( 1  809) 1 1 East 488, 495; 103 ER 1092, 1095; Danford v 
McAnulty (1883) 8 App Cas 456, 460-1, 462, 464-5; Oxford Meat Co v McDonald 
[I9631 63 SR (NSW) 423,425,427. 
78 GrahamvPeat(l801) 1 East 244; 102ER95; Catterisv Cowper(1812)4Taunt 547; 128 
ER 444; Corporation of Hustings v Ivall(1874) 19 LR Eq 558. 
79 The Kingv Bishop of Worcester (1669) Vaugh 53, 58,60; 124 ER 967,969,970; Asher v 
Whitlock (1865) LR 1 QB 1 ;  Rosenberg v Cook (1881) 8 QB 162, 165; Mussammat 
Sundar v Mussammat Parbati ( 1  889) LR 16 IA 186, 193; Perry v Clissold [I9071 AC 73, 
79. 
80 Peaceable d Uncle v Watson ( 1  8 1 1 )  4 Taunt 16; 128 ER 232; Doe d Carter v Barnard 
(1849) 13 QB 945, 953; 116 E R  1524, 1527; Asher v Whitlock (1865) 1 QB 1 ,  6. 
81 DoedHaNv Penfold(1838) 8 Car &P 536,537; 173 ER 607,608. Eg, an occup~er might 
be shown to be seised for life, or to have come to the land under a lease. 
82 See Elvis v The Archbishop of York (1 619) Hob 316, 323; 80 ER 458, 465; Asher v 
Whitlock (1865) LR 1 QB 1, 6; c f  Rosenberg v Cook (1881) 8 QB 162, 165. 
83 Eg, see Doed Crisp v Barber(1788) 2 T R  749; 100 ER 403; Har2er v Charlesworth ( 1  825) 
4 B & C  574; 107ER 1174. 
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These fundamental rules of real property law have been applied in Australia 
as part of the English law which the settlers brought with them.84 Unless some 
valid reason can be found for this not to have happened, they should therefore 
have applied to give Aboriginals prima facie title in fee simple to any lands 
occupied by them at the time of ~et t lement .~~ However, this presumptive fee 
simple title could be rebutted by the Crown or its grantee, if shown that the 
lands became Crown lands at that time.86 
This takes us back to our discussion of the pre-Milirrpum decisions, on the 
basis of which, and as a matter of legal principle, we concluded that the Crown 
acquired absolute title to vacant lands in Australia by occupancy. So would 
the Crown have acquired title by the same means to lands occupied by Abor- 
iginals? The answer is definitely no, for the simple reason that lands have to be 
both unowned and unoccupied to be available for acquisition by occupancy.87 
The Crown's occupancy of the territory as a whole would not have extended to 
lands occupied by Aboriginals, no more than occupancy of a manor left 
vacant by the death of a pur autre vie lord would have extended to lands held 
by tenants of the manor. In such a case, the occupant of the manor would have 
become lord of the tenants and their lands, and therefore would have been 
entitled to the services owed by them.88 In much the same way, though on a 
higher plane, the Crown would have acquired a paramount lordship over the 
Aboriginals and their lands, and would have been entitled to their allegiance 
as new subjects.89 Though no lordship would have existed (customary law 
aside) prior to colonization, the effect of applying the system of tenures in 
these circumstances would have been to create such a lordship in the Crown, 
since by English law subjects cannot own land allodially, but only an estate or 
interest held mediately or immediately of the Cr~wn.~ '  
84 Doed Devine v Wilson (1855) 10 Moo PC 502, 523-4; 14 ER 58 1, 589; Perry v Clissold 
[I9071 AC 73; Wheeler v Baldwin (1 934) 52 CLR 609,621-2, 632-3; Allen v Roughley 
(1955) 94 CLR 98; Oxford Meat Co v McDonald [I9631 SR (NSW) 423. 
85 Note that English law has been generally applied to Aboriginals, even in circumstances 
where this would seem inappropriate: see MC Kriewaldt, 'The Application of the Crimi- 
nal Law to the Aborigines of the Northern Territory of Australia' (1 960) 5 UWAL Rev 1 ; 
Australia Law Reform Commission, The Recognition ofAboriginal Customary Laws 
(1986), vol I, esp ch 4. 
86 See Doed Devine v Wilson (1855) 10 Moo PC 502,523-4; 14 ER 581,589; Emmerson v 
Maddison [I9061 AC 569, 575. 
87 See Holden vSmallbrooke(l668)Vaugh 187,191-2; 124 ER 1030,1033. At Vaugh 189, 
124 ER 103 1, it is written: 'Two or more cannot, at the same time, have severally plenary 
possession, that is, occupancy, ofthe same thing; therefore none can have right to that by 
reason of possession, whereof another is already possess'd, for then there would be two 
plenary possessors severally of the same thing at the same time, which is impossible.' 
88 Id, Vaugh 190, 196; 124 ER 1032, 1035. Nor would it matter if some of those tenants 
were in fact wrongdoers, for the lord of a manor has no special right to lands of his 
tenants which happen to be held by disseisors: see YB 9 Hen VII 24, pl 1 I, where it was 
said that a disseisee could enter upon a lord who claimed by escheat the lands held by the 
disseisor. 
g9 By British colonial law the inhabitants of a newly-acquired territory become subjects of 
the Crown at the moment of acauisition: Calvin's Case (1608) 7 Co R ~ D  la. 6a: 77 ER 
377,384; ~ a m ~ b e l l v ~ a 1 1 ( 1 7 7 4 ' ) ~ o f f t  655,741; 98 ER 848,895; ~ a l d e i v ~ - ~ o f ~ r i t i s h  
Columbia [I9731 SCR 313, 388-9; R v Wedge [I9761 1 NSWLR 581, 585. 
90 CaseofTanistry(l608) Davis28,40-1; 80ER 516,528; Witrongv Blany(1674) 3 Keble 
401,402; 84 ER 789,789; and discussion in McNeil, supra fn 7,79-80,216-221. Note, 
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In the Milirrpum case, however, Blackburn J viewed the system of tenures 
as excluding the possibility, at common law, of any title in the Aboriginals. He 
reasoned that since it is a fundamental principle of English law that the Crown 
is the source of title to all land, the land titles of subjects in Australia must all 
be the direct consequence of Crown grants.9' This conclusion ignores both the 
purpose for which original Crown ownership was postulated in England, and 
the fictional nature of the explanation for the universality of feudal tenure. As 
explained above, the notion that the Crown originally owned all the lands in 
England is generally a fiction, invented not to deprive subjects of their land- 
holdings, but to assure the Crown of its paramount lordship. In fact, many (if 
not most) land titles in England were never derived from Crown grants. A 
fictitious title in the Crown, and along with it fictitious grants to landholding 
subjects, was fabricated to explain why the Crown has a lordship in those 
 circumstance^.^^ Application of this two-fold fiction to lands occupied by 
Aboriginals at the time the Crown acquired sovereignty in Australia must lead 
to the same result - the Crown would be deemed to have owned the lands, 
and then to have granted them to the Aboriginals. The fiction, because it 
postulatesgrants as well as original Crown ownership, supports Aboriginal 
land claims, rather than negating them as Blackburn J thought. The view that 
Aboriginal occupiers must have actual grants to have valid titles as against the 
Crown is therefore incorrect. As in England, perfectly valid titles can exist 
where grants were in fact never made. Applying the feudal fiction in those 
circumstances simply provides a justifiable basis for the Crown's lordship 
over those lands. 
Where lands occupied by Aboriginals were concerned, then, the effect of the 
colonization of Australia and reception of English law would have been to 
create a presumption of title to fee simple estates in the Aboriginal occupiers. 
The Crown would not have acquired title to those lands by occupancy, for the 
Aboriginal presence would have excluded that po~sibil i ty.~~ Nor would the 
application of the system of tenures have given the Crown title. Since the 
effect of applying that system and the fiction associated with it would have 
been to assure the Crown of its paramount lordship, the Aboriginal occupiers 
would have held their fee simple estates as tenants of the Crown. The Crown 
would have been entitled to the benefits of its lordship, but it would have had 
however, that the application of the system of tenures may be excluded by local custom: 
see Smith v Lerwick Harbour Trustees (1903) (5th) 5 SC 680; Lord Advocate v Balfour 
[ 19071 SC 1 360. 
91 Supra, text at fn 16. 
92 See McNeil, supra fn 7,80-85. Note that the foreshore and territorial seabed are treated 
differently, because they are generally unoccupied by subjects, and because the public 
has special rights respecting them: Id, 103-105. 
93 The reason why the Aboriginal presence did not also prevent the acquisition of terri- 
torial sovereignty by settlement is that the Crown has prerogative power to annex 
territories to its dominions by act of state: see supra, fn 41-2 and text. But once annex- 
ation had taken place, the Crown could not seize lands occupied by Aboriginals because 
the common law does not allow the Crown to commit acts of state within its own 
dominions: Entick v Carrington (1 765) 19 St Tr 1029; Walker v Baird [I8921 AC 49 1 ; 
Johnstone v Pedlar [I9211 2 AC 262; A-G v Nissan [I9701 AC 179. 
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no claim to the lands themselve~,~~ and would have been unable to make a 
valid grant of them or of any interest in them,95 as long as the Aboriginals 
continued to hold their fee simple estates. 
ABORIGINAL LAND CLAIMS TODAY 
Up to this point, our discussion has centred on the respective claims of the 
Crown and Aboriginal occupiers at the time the Australian colonies were set- 
tled. We shall now briefly relate our conclusions concerning these matters to 
present-day non-statutory land claims. 
Assuming that Aboriginals were in occupation of specific lands at the time 
the Crown acquired sovereignty, the presumptive fee simple titles which they 
would have had as a result can be claimed by their descendants. However, if in 
the meantime those lands have been adversely occupied (by settlers, for ex- 
ample) for the statutory limitation period, those claims may be barred in law. 
Moreover, proving linkage between present-day Aboriginal claimants and 
their alleged predecessors may be extremely difficult; in fact, one reason why 
the Aboriginal plaintiffs in the Milirrpum case lost was that they were unable 
to establish a sufficient connection between themselves and the Aboriginals 
who had been present on the claimed lands in 1788.96 Not only is identifi- 
cation of occupiers - whether individuals or groups - especially problem- 
atic at this distance in time, but shifting memberships and the disappearance 
of some groups and creation of others can present serious  complication^.^' 
Some of these problems can be avoided if the Aboriginals who claim title 
are presently in occupation of the lands claimed by them. In that situation, 
they can rely on their own occupation and the common law presumption that 
occupiers of land have title to fee simple estates. Moreover, as against tres- 
passers and adverse claimants who cannot show a better right in themselves, 
we have seen that occupation itself is a sufficient title. As long as the Abor- 
iginals are in occupation, there is no need for them to take their claim to court. 
Since they already have the lands, all they need do is defend their occupation 
against anyone who interferes with it or attempts to take the lands from 
them. 
94 If the Crown had laid an information of intrusion against Aboriginal occupiers, relying 
on the procedural advantages which that special action gave to it, the Aboriginals could 
have answered by showing that the Crown had never been in possession, in the absence 
of which there could have been no intrusion: see McNeil, supra fn 7, 98-103, 219. 
95 Where the Crown attempts to grant land concerning which it has neither possession nor 
title, the grant is void, and anyone who enters under it is a wrongdoer: Viner's Abridg- 
ment (2nd ed, London, Robinson, 1791-4), title 'Disseisin' (D) 19, marginal note; 
Comyns'Digest (5th ed, New York, Collins & Hannay, 1822), title 'Seisin' (Fl). Note, 
however, that not being bound by Quia Emptores (1290) 18 Edw I (Eng), the Crown 
could subinfeudate, which is one way of interpreting the colonial charters in North 
America: see McNeil, supra fn 7, 235-41. 
96 (1971) 17 FLR 141, 183-98. Note that Canadian courts have been less strict in this 
regard: see Baker Lake v Minister oflndian Affairs [I9801 1 FC 5 18; Simon v R [I9851 2 
SCR 387,407-8. 
9' On the further issue, which cannot be discussed here, of how unincorporated groups with 
shifting memberships can hold title to land, see McNeil, supra fn 7, 21 1-15. 
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However, should the Aboriginals be faced with serious, prolonged, or re- 
peated interference with their occupation, they may be obliged to go to court. 
In that event, the appropriate action for them to bring would be trespass. They 
should not ask for a declaration of title, for that is unnecessary and would 
involve problems of proof of the kind referred to above. In an action of tres- 
pass, they could rely on their occupation, and force the defendant to prove 
justification by showing some right or title which made the interference 
An alleged trespasser who claims under a Crown grant would obviously set 
up the grant as evidence of a superior title and hence of a right to enter. But 
where the Aboriginals were in occupation when it was issued, the grant would 
be of little value unless shown that the Crown had title at the time.99 The 
defendant, however, instead of having to lead evidence to prove the Crown's 
title, would be able to rely on the pre-Milirrpum decisions which held that 
judicial notice could be taken of the Crown's title to lands that were unap- 
propriated or waste at the time the Australian colonies were settled. The onus 
would thus be on the Aboriginal plaintiffs to show that the lands occupied by 
them were not unappropriated or waste at that time, which could be done by 
proving that the lands were either owned by customary law or occupied. 
Our concern here is with occupation rather than customary law title. If it 
was established that Aboriginals were in occupation of the lands when the 
Crown acquired sovereignty, then, according to the common law principles 
outlined above, the Crown's interest in those lands would have been limited 
to a lordship over them. A Crown claim to the lands themselves would have to 
be proved by showing that the lands had escheated or had otherwise been 
acquired by the Crown. Failing that, the Crown, and hence its grantee, would 
be without a title, and so the interference of the grantee with the plaintiffs' 
occupation would be an actionable trespass. It would not be necessary for the 
plaintiffs to prove linkage between themselves and the Aboriginals who were 
in occupation at the time of colonization, for if the Crown's alleged title was 
rebutted by showing that the lands were not unappropriated or waste at that 
time, the plaintiffs would be able to rely on their present occupation. 
However, proving Aboriginal occupation of specific lands at the time of 
colonization may itself be a formidable task."' Though the matter cannot be 
pursued in detail here, there may nonetheless be a way to lessen the burden. As 
a rule judges are very reluctant to disturb long-standing occupation of land. 
Where someone has been in continuous, unchallenged occupation for many 
98 P F P Higgins, Elements of Torts in Australia (1st ed, Sydney, Butterworths, 1970), 114; 
Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (1 5th ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1982), ss 22- 1 l,22-26; 
Halsbury's Laws ofEngland (4th ed, 1985), vol XLV, paras 1394-5, 1405-8. 
99 See Bristow v Cormican (1878) 3 App Cas 641; Johnston v O'NeiN [I91 11 AC 552. 
loo An equivalent burden has, however, been met in at least one Canadian case: see Baker 
Lake v Minister of Indian Affairs [I9801 1 FC 518, 562-3, where the Inuit plaintiffs 
established that their ancestors had been in exclusive occupation of lands when the 
Crown asserted sovereignty over their territory, which happened probably no earlier 
than 1610 and no later than 1670. 
Has the Common Law been Misapplied to Dispossess the Aboriginals? 109 
years, they will generally do whatever they can to maintain the status quo.lO' 
One device used by them in these circumstances is the presumption of a lost 
grant,lo2 applied by some judges even in face of evidence that no grant had 
ever been made.lo3 The suggestion made here is not that the presumption of a 
lost grant be applied to Aboriginal occupiers (though that may be an option 
worth considering), but that long, undisturbed occupation down to the 
present-day be taken as evidence that the same lands were occupied by Abor- 
iginals at the time of colonization. The onus of proof in these circumstances is 
not unlike the onus on persons in England who allege the existence of a custom 
since time immemorial, ie, since 1 189. In that situation the law, aware of the 
virtual impossibility of ever meeting such an onerous burden, presumes the 
custom to have existed since time immemorial if proved to have existed dur- 
ing the period of living memory, provided its antiquity and continuity are not 
contradicted.lo4 For the same reason, proof of Aboriginal occupation as far 
back as anyone can remember should raise a rebuttable presumption that the 
lands were occupied when the Crown acquired sovereignty.'05 
Aboriginals who are still in undisturbed occupation of lands are therefore 
advised not to initiate court action, unless necessary to protect their occu- 
pation against trespassers. In the meantime, there are steps that might be 
taken to strengthen their legal claim to those lands. In the first place, to pre- 
vent valuable evidence from being lost they could record information 
respecting the group's traditional social organization, the known length of 
their connection with the land, the ways in which the land has been used and 
the area occupied.'06 This information could then be used to make their occu- 
Io1  In Attorney-General v Lord Hotham (1823) Turn & R 209,218, 37 ER 1077, 1081, the 
Master of the Rolls observed: 'Very high judges have said they would presume any thing 
in favour of a long enjoyment and uninterrupted possession.' Accord Rogers v Brooks 
(1783) 1 TR431 n(a); 99ER 1179 n(a); RoedJohnson vZreland(l809) 11 East 280,284; 
103 ER 1011, 1013. 
Io2 Eg, Bedle v Beard (1 607) 12 Co R 4b; 77 ER 1288; GoodtitledParker v Baldwin (1 809) 1 1 
East 488; 103 ER 1092; Doe d Devine v Wilson (1 855) 10 Moo PC 502,527; 14 ER 58 1, 
591. 
Io3 Whitev McLean (1890) 24 SALR 97, 101; Tehidy Minerals v Norman [I9711 2 QB 528, 
552. 
Io4 Bastard v Smith (1837) 2 M & Rob 129, 136; 174 ER 238, 240; Hammerton v Honey 
(1876) 24 WR 603; Mercer v Denne [I 9041 2 Ch 534, 555-6. For application of this rule 
in a colonial context to establish a customary law right to a reef, see Hanasiki v Symes 
(Judicial Commissioner, Solomon Islands, 1 7 August 195 1, unreported decision of 
Charles J) in B Hocking, supra fn 62,254. The rule has been applied in Canada as well in 
thecontext ofcustomary adoption: ReKitchooalik and Tucktoo(1972) 28 DLR (3d) 483, 
488. 
Io5 In Carinlo v Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, 2 12 US 449 (1 909), a suc- 
cessful land claim based on Igorot custom and long occupation, Holmes J, delivering the 
unanimous judgment of the United States Supreme Court, said at 460: '. . . every pre- 
sumption is and ought to be against the Government in a case like the present. It might, 
perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory 
goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be 
presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and 
never to have been public land.' 
Io6 Anthropologists, historians or other experts could be asked to record the information, as 
has been done in parts of Canada: eg, see Brice-Bennett, ed, Our Footprints Are Every- 
where: Inuit Land Use and Occupancy in Labrador (1 977); H Brody, Maps and Dreams: 
Indians and the British Columbia Frontier (2nd ed, London, Norman & Woodhouse, 
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pation known to the world. Everyone in the community could participate in 
this activity, which might take many forms, from pursuing traditional hunt- 
ing and gathering patterns to posting signs in appropriate locations. A par- 
ticularly important action would be to inform strangers who intrude on the 
land that they are trespassing, and to either give them permission to stay or 
ask them to leave. In these ways, and by as many other peaceful acts in relation 
to the land as can be thought of, the group would be creating their own evi- 
dence of occupation. By treating the land as theirs, they would be strength- 
ening their right to it. As long as their occupation is not challenged, or 
seriously interfered with, they need do no more. But if they do have to go to 
court, they will be able to reply on the occupation which their own acts have 
established. 
1983); Elias, 'Rights and Research: The Role of the Social Sciences in the Legal and 
Political Resolution of Land Claims and Questions of Aboriginal Rights' [I9891 1 
CNLR 1 .  
